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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature

Of The Case
Robert Henry Weliever appeals from his judgment of conviction for possession of

methamphetamine, entered 0n a conditional guilty
court erred

Statement

by denying

Of The

The

his

Facts

is

made

On

Proceedings

none 0f Which are disputed 0n appeal:

July 23, 2018, detective Shane

Ofﬁce observed

Murphy knew

that the district

the following factual ﬁndings in association With the motion t0

the subj ect 0f this appeal,

Sheriff’s

and argues 0n appeal

to suppress evidence.

And Course Of The

district court

suppress that

motion

plea,

Murphy of

the defendant driving a gray

the Defendant

the Minidoka County
Mercury Topaz. Detective

had an outstanding warrant

for his arrest out of

Cassia County. Additionally, running the vehicle’s plates revealed they did not

match the vehicle and were ﬁctitious. He thus initiated a trafﬁc stop. Upon
making contact, the detective informed the Defendant he was under arrest
pursuant to an outstanding warrant and took him into custody. At the time of the
stop there were two dogs inside the Defendant’s vehicle. The Defendant informed
the detective that Kathy Strate could come t0 the scene and retrieve the dogs.
Arrangements were made and Kathy Strata subsequently arrived and retrieved the
dogs. She was also allowed t0 retrieve some women’s clothing from the vehicle
that

belonged to

stop.

her.

Meanwhile, detective Matt Love arrived 0n the scene t0 assist with the
The two detectives conducted an inventory search 0f the vehicle and

completed an impound inventory form. During the search, detective Love located
a syringe in the pocket 0f a jacket lying behind the center console. After the search

was complete,
(R., p.63.)

the vehicle

was towed.

The contents 0f
Ls.1-14.1)

On

the syringe later tested positive for methamphetamine.

September

(P.H. Tr., p.29,

2018, Ofﬁcer Love initiated a second trafﬁc stop of a vehicle

19,

driven by Strate and in Which Weliever

was

the passenger. (P.H. T11, p.9, L.21

initiated the stop for three reasons: to arrest Strate

— p.10,

test results

syringe recovered in July; and because the vehicle failed to properly signal a turn.

—

1.)

He

on a separate matter; because Ofﬁcer Love

recognized Weliever and had probable cause to arrest him based 0n the

p.21, L.18

L.1

p.22, L.19; p.29, Ls.1-14; p.31, Ls.8-14.)

As Weliever stepped from

from the
(P.H. T11,

the vehicle,

ofﬁcers observed what appeared t0 be a methamphetamine pipe tucked into the side of his shoe.

(P.H. T11, p.1

1,

L.14 — p.12, L.16; p.31, L.15 — p.32, L9.) Weliever was arrested and, 0n the

t0 the jail, told ofﬁcers that

way

he was in possession 0f a bag of methamphetamine. (P.H. TL, p.12,

L.11 — p.13, L.9.)

Weliever was charged With two counts of possession of methamphetamine, based 0n the

methamphetamine found

in

both July and September,

and one count 0f possession 0f

paraphernalia based on the pipe in his possession in September.

charged him as a persistent Violator.

(R., pp.20-22.)

He was

also

(R., p.23.)

Weliever ﬁled a motion t0 suppress arguing that the inventory search of his vehicle in
July violated his federal and state constitutional rights because

1

The ﬁle

titled

“Appeal Volume

transcripts: (1) the transcript

1

—

it

failed in

some unspeciﬁed way

ﬁve independently paginated
pages 1 — 39 0f the document as a
hearing on Weliever’s motion t0 suppress,

Transcripts” contains

of the preliminary hearing,

at

Whole, hereinafter “P.H. Tn”; (2) the transcript of the
at pages 40 — 157 of the document as a whole, hereinafter “Mot. Supp. TL”; (3) the transcript of a
hearing in Which the court addressed Weliever’s failed drug test during the pendency 0f the

— 171 of the document as a Whole; (4) the transcript of the change of
plea hearing, at pages 172 — 185 of the document as a whole, hereinafter “Change of Plea TL”;
and, (5) the transcript of the sentencing hearing, at pages 186 — 192 of the document as a Whole.
proceedings, at pages 158

Following Weliever’s opening
entire

document.

brief, references to

page numbers are

t0 the pagination

of the

comply With procedure,

to

and

that evidence recovered in

that time

was a

pp.26-29.)

He

the decision t0

result

later

impound

the hearing

Tr., p.52,

list

arrest at

July.

(R.,

which decision made an inventory search necessary,

his vehicle in July,

(R., pp.45-48.)

on the motion

to suppress, the state introduced the policy regarding

that requires ofﬁcers to

conduct an inventory search 0f such a vehicle (Mot.

Ls.16-23; Exs., pp.5-7), as well as the inventory form completed

after the inventory search (Mot.

a

result,

ﬁled an “amended” motion to suppress in Which he additionally argued that

impounding vehicles
Supp.

September should likewise be suppressed because the

0f probable cause associated With testing of the syringe found in

was “unreasonabl[e].”
At

found in that search must be suppressed as a

that the syringe

Supp.

Tr., p.91,

he composed roughly six months

L.9

— p.92,

the ofﬁcers

Weliever introduced

L.8; Exs., p. 8).

after the trafﬁc stop in

by

which he attempted

t0 recall the

contents of the vehicle. (Mot. Supp. Tr., p.128, Ls.10-25; p.132, Ls.2-6; p.136, Ls.2-7; Exs, pp.

3-4.)

Ofﬁcers Murphy and Love testiﬁed that the decision to impound the vehicle and conduct

an

inventory

search

occupant—Weliever—was

arrested

associated

was

made

because

would not

Though

(Mot. Supp.

have driven both away, she was not

listed

on the

registration

Weliever’s vehicle had both ﬁctitious plates and was not insured.
25; p.70, Ls.2-14; p.77, Ls.9-21; p.89, L.20

list

Tr., p.47, L.1

Strate arrived while ofﬁcers

release the vehicle t0 her because she arrived alone in her

policy to require that they create a

owner

registered

and

only

0n an outstanding warrant and the car was parked on the side

0f the road in a manner presenting a potential hazard.
p.54, Ls.1-19; p.64, Ls.16-25.)

the

—

p.90, L.7.)

They

were

own

still

—

p.48, L.5;

0n scene, they

car and so could not

0f Weliever’s vehicle, and
(Mot. Supp.

T11, p.50,

Ls.15-

testiﬁed that they understood the

of items 0f value in the vehicle, not a

list

of every single

item in the vehicle, and that they believed they created such a
21; p.60, L.19

— p.62,

—

(Mot. Supp. TL, p.55, Ls.5-

L.9; p.90, Ls.8-15.)

Strate testiﬁed that Weliever’s vehicle

p.108, L.24

list.

was parked “way

off” the road

(Mot. Supp.

p.109, L2), that she asked if she could take the vehicle to prevent

impounded and was

told she could not (Mot. Supp. Tr., p.109, L.20

—

from being

it

and

p.1 10, L.5),

T11,

that the

inventory completed by the ofﬁcers was not complete, pointing in particular t0 the fact that they
did not

list

each tool in the vehicle individually (Mot. Supp.

acknowledged

that she did not really

know what was

Tr., p.1

in the vehicle.

Ls.9-16; p.1 18, Ls.8-14.) Weliever testiﬁed that the vehicle

of the road.”

(Mot. Supp.

Tr.,

p.124, L.21

—

1 1,

p.125, L.4.)

was

He

Ls.1 1-18).

But she

(Mot. Supp.

Tr.,

later

p.115,

“three t0 four feet off the side

claimed that he “argued” with

ofﬁcers about whether Strate could take his car and was told she could not, with the ofﬁcers

citing policy.

(Mot. Supp.

T11,

p.126, L.18

— p.127,

L.12.)

Referring t0 his

list

0f the vehicle’s

contents generated roughly six months after the events, he testiﬁed that the ofﬁcers’ inventory

was not complete,
vehicle

was

that “everything

valuable. (Mot. Supp. Tr., p.127, L.18

Though acknowledging
vehicle

he owned” was in the vehicle, and that everything in the

that the

was not insured and had

“Wind

is

— p.128,

L.25; p.136, L.5

He

ﬁctitious plates, Weliever’s attorney

still

it.

argued that ofﬁcers

(Mot. Supp.

T11,

p.140,

then argued that ofﬁcers failed to conduct the inventory search in

accordance with the written policy, and the court should infer bad
create an appropriately exhaustive

p.147, L.3.)

L.4.)

taken out 0f our sails” by the fact that the

should have turned the vehicle over to Strate rather than impounding

L.18 — p.142, L.1.)

— p.138,

list

of the vehicle’s contents.

faith,

because they failed to

(Mot. Supp.

Tr.,

p.142, L.2

—

In a written order, the district court denied the

that

it

was proper

safety risk,

and

t0

impound

that ofﬁcers

was uninsured, had
her vehicle away.

motion

the vehicle because Weliever

were not required

t0 suppress.

was

The court held

arrested and the vehicle

to turn the vehicle over to Strate

when

ﬁrst

posed a

the vehicle

ﬁctitious plates,

and she was alone and could not drive both Weliever’s and

(R., pp.64-65.)

Second, the court found that the inventory search was

conducted pursuant to a standardized policy, and not in bad

faith,

Where the ofﬁcers

items that they judged t0 be valuable. (R., pp.66-68.) The court did not

list

of items allegedly in the vehicle both because

his

motion

to suppress,

it

was created well

ﬁnd

listed the

credible Weliever’s

after the events t0 support

and because Weliever had not even correctly recalled the type 0f vehicle,

mistakenly stating that the Mercury Topaz he was driving was a “Ford Turus.”

(R.,

pp.67—68

(quoting EXS, p.3).)

Two months

Weliever ﬁled a motion for reconsideration, referring t0 preliminary

later,

hearing testimony from Ofﬁcers

Murphy and Love

in

an attempt to show alleged “discrepancies”

in their testimony. (R., pp.99-103.)

The

district court

denied the motion in another written order.

was evidence

It

held,

testimony was not “new evidence” that would support a motion to

ﬁrst, that preliminary hearing

reconsider, but

(R., pp.104-05.)

that could

t0 suppress in the ﬁrst place.

(R.,

have been but was not admitted in support of the motion

p.104

n.1,)

More

importantly, though, the court held that the

preliminary hearing testimony t0 Which Weliever pointed was not inconsistent with the testimony

at the

motion

to suppress,

and

change the court’s analysis.
Weliever

methamphetamine,

entered

in

in fact

was simply cumulative of that

latter

testimony, and did not

(R., pp.104-05.)

a

conditional

guilty

exchange for which the

state

plea

to

one

count

0f

possession

0f

agreed to dismiss the remaining charges, with

Weliever reserving his right to appeal the denial of his motion t0 suppress. (Change of Plea TL,
p.173, L.24

— p.175,

L.8; p.181, L.20

— p.182,

L.12.)

The

district court

entered a uniﬁed sentence

0f seven years With two years ﬁxed, but suspended that sentence in favor of three years of
probation. (R., pp.130-35.) Weliever timely appealed. (R., pp.138-41.)

IS SUE

Weliever

Did the

states the issue

on appeal

as:

district court err in failing to

suppress the evidence gathered in Violation of

Mr. Weliever’s Fourth Amendment rights?
(Appellant’s brief, p.4.)

The

state rephrases the issue as:

Has Weliever

failed to

show

that the district court erred

by denying

his

motion

to suppress?

ARGUMENT
The
A.

District

Court Did Not Err

BV Denying Weliever’s Motion To

Suppress

Introduction

Weliever has abandoned the argument that his vehicle should not have been impounded
(Appellant’s brief, p.5 n2), and instead argues only that the inventory search necessitated

doing so was not conducted in accordance With policy, and so was an
Fourth Amendment, because the ofﬁcers did not exhaustively

list

illegal search

by

under the

every item in the vehicle on the

inventory form they completed (Appellant’s brief, pp.6-10). The district court correctly rejected

that

argument below. The court found as a matter of fact

that every item in the car

be

listed, that

that the inventory policy did not require

ofﬁcers complied with the policy by listing the items that

they judged to be valuable, and the court did not credit Weliever’s testimony regarding the
contents of the vehicle.

(R., pp.66-68.)

accordance With policy and not in bad

The court found

faith,

Standard

are

in

district court erred.

Of Review

“The standard of review of a suppression motion
motion

was conducted

and those ﬁndings are supported by substantial and

competent evidence. Weliever has not shown that the

B.

that the search

is

bifurcated.

When

to suppress is challenged, the appellate court accepts the trial court's

a decision

on a

ﬁndings of fact that

supported by substantial evidence, but freely reviews the application 0f constitutional

principles t0 those facts.”

power

State V. Diaz, 144 Idaho 300, 302, 160 P.3d 739, 741 (2007).

to assess the credibility

0f Witnesses, resolve factual conﬂicts, weigh evidence, and draw

factual inferences is vested in the trial court.

P.2d 993, 997 (1995); State

The

V. Fleenor,

State V. Valdez-Molina, 127 Idaho 102, 106,

897

133 Idaho 552, 555, 989 P.2d 784, 787 (Ct. App. 1999).

The

appellate court also gives deference t0 any implicit ﬁndings of the trial court supported

substantial evidence. State V. Brauch, 133 Idaho 215, 218,

C.

984 P.2d 703, 706 (1999).

Weliever Has Not Adequatelv Presented Or Preserved
Court’s Denial

by

Any

Challenge T0 The District

Of His Motion For Reconsideration

Roughly two months

after his

motion

to suppress

was denied, Weliever ﬁled a motion

for

reconsideration referring t0 the transcript of the preliminary hearing, Which had not been

submitted in support 0f the motion to suppress.

(R., pp.99-103.)

The

district court

denied the

motion both because the preliminary hearing testimony was available and could have been
submitted in support of the motion to suppress in the ﬁrst place, and because the testimony from
the preliminary hearing

was cumulative of the testimony provided

at the

motion

t0 suppress

and

did not change the court’s analysis. (R., pp.104-05.)
In the “Statement of the Case” section of his brief, but only there, Weliever indicates an

intent to

argue that the district court erred by “denying his motion for reconsideration.”

(Appellant’s brief, p.1.)

his

However, Weliever does not separately

list

motion for reconsideration as an issue 0n appeal (Appellant’s

cite case

law applicable

any way

at

to the

the district court’s denial of

brief, p.4),

review 0f a denial 0f a motion for reconsideration, and does not in

any point in the argument section of his brief discuss the

regarding the motion for reconsideration 0r explain

how

The word “reconsideration” does not appear anywhere
and Course of Proceedings”

does not discuss or

section.

district court’s

the district court erred

V.

by denying

in the brief after the “Statement

(E generally Appellant’s brief, pp.4-12.)

not listed as an issue on appeal are waived, Clark

reasoning

it.

of Facts

Claims of error

Jones Gledhill Fuhrman Gourlev, P.A., 163

Idaho 215, 230, 409 P.3d 795, 810 (2017), as are issues not supported by either authority 0r
argument, State

V.

Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263, 923 P.2d 966, 970 (1996).

Weliever also did not preserve the right t0 appeal the

issue.

The entry of a

valid guilty

plea constitutes a waiver of nonjurisdictional defects in prior proceedings unless the same are

preserved for appellate review through entry of a conditional guilty plea under Idaho Criminal

Rule

11(a)(2).

m

State V. Hosey, 134 Idaho 883, 889, 11 P.3d 1101, 1107 (2000).

Idaho

Criminal Rule 11(a)(2) permits the entry of a conditional guilty plea preserving the right to
appeal from “any speciﬁed adverse ruling.” Weliever’s plea preserved his right t0 appeal from
the denial of his “motion to suppress.” (Change 0f Plea Tr., p.174, L.21

— p.175,

L.8.)

While he

preserved the right to appeal from the denial of his motion t0 suppress, the denial of his motion

for reconsideration

m,

134 Idaho

was a

separate “adverse ruling” not preserved in his conditional plea.

at 889, 11

ruling related to but distinct

P.3d

at

E

1107 (refusing to consider allegation 0f error in adverse

from the issue preserved

in a conditional plea).

Both because Weliever has not appropriately raised the issue on appeal and has not
preserved

it

below, the propriety 0f the

not before the Court.

If this

district court’s denial

of his motion for reconsideration

is

Court disagrees and determines that Weliever has adequately and

properly raised the district court’s denial 0f his motion for reconsideration, the state contends that
the district court did not abuse

its

discretion

by denying

the motion.

State V.

Montague, 114

Idaho 319, 320, 756 P.2d 1083, 1084 (Ct. App. 1988) (holding that motions for reconsideration
are reviewed for an abuse of discretion).

That

is

so both because the district court

required to consider testimony that could have been but

motion

to suppress,

was not

initially

and because the court correctly concluded

testimony was consistent with the testimony

at the

affect the court’s analysis.

10

was not

ﬁled in support of the

that the preliminary hearing

hearing 0n the motion t0 suppress and did not

The

D.

District

Court Properly Denied Weliever’s Motion T0 Suppress

The Fourth Amendment
search

is

presumptively unreasonable unless

exceptions to the warrant requirement.”

(Ct.

App. 2000)

(citing

Coolidge

Ferreira, 133 Idaho 474, 479,

“A

prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures?

V.

falls

it

warrantless

within certain special and well-delineated

State V. Kerley, 134 Idaho 870, 873, 11 P.3d 489,

New

Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-455 (1971); State

988 P.2d 700, 705

(Ct.

App. 1999)).

276 P.3d 740, 742

U.S. 367, 371 (1987); Illinois

V. Lafayette,

(Ct.

App. 2012)

V.

“Inventory searches are a

well-recognized exception to the warrant requirement 0f the Fourth Amendment.”
Stewart, 152 Idaho 868, 870,

492

(citing

462 U.S. 640, 643 (1983);

Colorado

State V.

State V.

V. Bertine,

479

Owen, 143 Idaho

274, 277, 141 P.3d 1143, 1146 (Ct. App. 2006)). “The legitimate purposes of inventory searches

are: (1) protect the

owner’s property while

it

remains in police custody; (2) protect the State

against false claims of 10st or stolen property; and (3) protect police from potential danger.” Li.

(citing

South Dakota

lawfully

V.

impounded an automobile

permitted t0 inventory

(1995).

Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 369-370 (1976)).

Such a search

its

is

in carrying out their

contents.”

State V.

community caretaking

it is

Amendment

criteria,”

routine.” Illinois V. Lafayette,

Colorado

function, they are

as a routine administrative

not a subterfuge for a warrantless investigatory

search Without probable cause, Florida V. Wells, 495 U.S.

with “standardized

the police have

Weaver, 127 Idaho 288, 290, 900 P.2d 196, 198

reasonable under the Fourth

caretaking function of the police, so long as

“When

V. Bertine,

1,

3 (1990),

and so long as

it

complies

479 U.S. 367, 375 (1987), 0r “established

462 U.S. 640, 648 (1983).

2

Weliever does not argue on appeal that the Idaho Constitution provides any greater protection
in this area than does the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
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Because Weliever does not dispute the
lawfully

impounded

were permitted

comply With

his vehicle

t0 search

it

district

court’s conclusion that the ofﬁcers

(Appellant’s brief, p.5 n2), he does not deny that the ofﬁcers

and inventory

its

contents.

he argues that they did not

Instead,

sufﬁciently detailed

list

of the vehicle’s contents.

He

items” in the vehicle.

district court’s factual

(Appellant’s brief, p.8.) Weliever’s argument

that

is

contrary t0 the district court’s factual ﬁndings.

0n the inventory form because they

might be prone t0

theft.

0f

all

both contradicted by the

court found that the ofﬁcers complied With the written policy even if they did not

in the car

list

is

contrary

unsupported by any case law in his favor.

is

Weliever’s argument

First,

is

ﬁndings, which Weliever has not shown are clearly erroneous,

law directly 0n point, and

a

claims that they “failed to comply with the

[Sheriff s Ofﬁce] written policy’s standards” because they “did not include a complete

t0 case

make

the standardized criteria governing such searches because they did not

(R.,

listed the items that they

judged

t0

The

list

district

every item

be 0f value or

p.67 (ﬁnding that “listing the valuable items” or the “items

believed to be 0f value” was “reasonable and in conformity with the written policy” and
“consistent” With the purposes of that policy).) Both ofﬁcers testiﬁed repeatedly and consistently

that the policy did not require

them

to list every single item in the

the items that they judged to be valuable, the loss or theft of

harm

t0 the

p.74, L.10

that View.

owner 0r

—
It

in liability for the department.

p.76, L.2; p.90, Ls.8—15; p.100, Ls.2-8.)

impounded

which might

(Mot. Supp.

vehicle, but to

result in particular

T11, p.60,

L.19 — p.62, L9;

The language 0f the policy

requires searching “any location in the vehicle

t0 discover valuables or other items for safekeeping.”

whether 0r not

it

is

(EXS., p.7.)

judged to be valuable.
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itself supports

where you could reasonably expect
If ofﬁcers are not

required t0 search in areas not likely to contain valuables, they are not required to

in the vehicle

list

Nor would

list

even

every item

a policy that required

ofﬁcers to inventory every item in the vehicle, Without exception, be remotely reasonable or

practical.

is

Ofﬁcers cannot be expected to stand

at the side

of the road for hours before a vehicle

impounded While they separately 10g every scrap of paper, item of clothing, and piece of gum
Interpreting the policy as Weliever

in the vehicle.

absolutely everything in the car

is

is

suggesting

it

be interpreted, t0 require that

included 0n the inventory form, would Virtually guarantee that

the policy could never be satisﬁed.

There

is

no contrary evidence

to

show

that the policy requires the

item in the vehicle, without exception, be listed on the inventory
that the ofﬁcers failed to list

item in the

any items of value. T0 argue

impossible—that every

form—and n0

credible evidence

that the policy required listing every

C

car,

property from

Weliever points to the ﬁrst purpose 0f the policy, t0 “protect the owner’s

damage

or loss while the vehicle

is

in

law enforcement custody,”’ the

policy mentions a “‘detailed description of the contents

the vehicle “certainly

had value

t0

him even

if

999

of the vehicle, and the

fact that the

fact that items in

not apparent t0 the officers.” (Appellant’s brief,

pp.8-9 (quoting Exs., p.7).) But the language in the policy regarding a “detailed inventory of the
vehicle’s contents”

is

immediately followed by the direction t0 search for “valuables,” providing

a context regarding the level 0f detail required. (Exs., p.7.)
part designed to protect the

vehicle should be logged.

owner from
It

makes

Nor does

the fact that the policy

is

in

the loss 0r theft 0f property suggest that every item in the

perfect sense, given that purpose, t0 focus

on the items

that

appear to be 0f value in the vehicle, not any item that a defendant could claim post hoc had
sentimental or personal value in order to succeed 0n a motion t0 suppress—that

random item

is,

whatever

the defendant could identify that an ofﬁcer overlooked t0 support a motion t0

suppress.
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Regarding whether the ofﬁcers

listed

every item that was valuable 0r that they believed t0

be of value, Weliever claims that the ofﬁcers “did not
thorough search 0f the vehicle, or looked through

all its

testify

they had in fact conducted

containers, in search 0f items of value, as

That claim

(Appellant’s brief, p.8 (emphasis original).)

required by the policy.”

[a]

is

puzzling

because, again, the ofﬁcers repeatedly and consistently testiﬁed that they did exactly that, as the
policy required them t0 d0. (Mot. Supp. Tr., p. 55, Ls.5-25; p.60, L.19

p.76, L.2; p.90, Ls.8-15; p.100, Ls.2-8.)

—

p.62, L.9; p.74, L.10

—

Weliever implies that the ofﬁcers could not have

conducted an adequate search because they testiﬁed they spent “ﬁve or ten minutes” conducting
the search. (Appellant’s brief, p.8.)

While Ofﬁcer Murphy estimated

ten minutes, Ofﬁcer Love,

who

less than thirty minutes.

(Mot. Supp.

initiated the search, testiﬁed that

Tr., p.89,

it

that the search took

ﬁve

t0

took “somewhere around” but

— p.100,

Ls.20-23; p.99, L.19

assuming the search took around ten minutes, Weliever does not explain
taken longer, and does not cite any case law t0 suggest that there

is

L.1.)

Why

it

But even

should have

some minimum period of

time that ofﬁcers must spend searching. The ofﬁcers testiﬁed that the vehicle was largely ﬁlled

With clothing and two dogs, Which Ms. Strate took with her
p.50, Ls.4-14; p.54, L.20

small

— p.55,

L.1; p.81, Ls.1-5.) There

sedan—a Mercury Topaz—for

is

When

she arrived.

no reason

(Mot. Supp.

to believe a search

T11,

0f the

valuables should have taken two ofﬁcers longer than ten

minutes, and the ofﬁcers testiﬁed that they did not abandon the search after locating the syringe.

(Mot. Supp.

Tr.,

p.100, Ls.13-23.)

Weliever next contends that the
that the policy did not require

not

list

them

fact that the ofﬁcers included items

to include, including

everything they believed to be 0f value.
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on the inventory form

“MISC. TRASH,” shows

that they did

(Appellant’s brief, pp.8, 12.) That the

list

was

over-inclusive, including items that

it

was

was not required

under—inclusive, excluding items that

Finally,

t0

it

it

t0 include, hardly

was required

shows or suggests

to include.

and for good reason, Weliever does not rely 0n the

list

of items he created below

(E

argue that ofﬁcers did not itemize everything of value in the vehicle.

The

Appellant’s brief, pp.7-12.)

that

it

was created some

six

district court

months

did not

that

ﬁnd

after the search, for the

that list credible in light

generally

of the fact

purpose of supporting his motion t0

suppress, and did not even correctly identify the type 0f vehicle he

was

driving.

E

This Court does not second-guess credibility determinations on appeal.

(R., pp.67-68.)

State V. Lutton, 161

Idaho 556, 560, 388 P.3d 71, 75 (Ct. App. 2017) (“At a suppression hearing, the power t0 assess
the credibility of Witnesses, resolve factual conﬂicts,

is

vested in the

(“On appeal

trial

[this

There

is

court”);

Court

Wagner

V.

weigh evidence, and draw

Wagner, 160 Idaho 294, 299, 371 P.3d 807, 812 (2016)

not free t0 question the district court’s credibility determinations.”).

is]

substantial

and competent evidence

t0 support the district court’s factual

regarding the content 0f the policy and the ofﬁcers’ compliance with

a

trial

court in a criminal case are reviewed for clear error

should be overturned only

if

.

.

.

“The

it.

conclusion.”

is

Higgins

ﬁndings of

not supported by substantial evidence.” State V. Ish, 166 Idaho 492,

relevant evidence

V.

factual

ﬁndings

[and] [s]uch factual ﬁndings

461 P.3d 774, 783 (2020) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

competent evidence

factual inferences

“Substantial and

which a reasonable mind might accept

Larry Miller Subaru—Mitsubishi, 145 Idaho

1, 4,

t0 support a

175 P.3d 163, 166

(2007). Weliever falls far short of showing that the district court’s ﬁndings are clear error.

In addition t0 running squarely into factual ﬁndings that conﬂict With his premises,

Weliever’s argument has been addressed and rejected in Idaho. In State

834 P.2d 892

(Ct.

App. 1992), Bray argued

that

15

V.

Bray, 122 Idaho 375,

an inventory search 0f a motorcycle, including

Amendment

saddle bags, constituted a Fourth

ofﬁcer] did not

list all

the items found

Violation because

on the motorcycle.”

it

“was incomplete,

Li. at 379,

ofﬁcer explained that the purpose 0f the inventory search was not to
found,” but to

someone

the items that the ofﬁcer “‘felt

list

else or

of value.”

834 P.2d

“list

The

at 896.

each and every item

were of a vulnerable nature

Li. (quoting the ofﬁcer’s testimony).

in that [the

t0

be used by

The Court of Appeals

rejected

Bray’s argument, holding that the inventory search was reasonable, ofﬁcers were not required t0

list

everything found on the motorcycle, and Bray failed t0

379-82, 834 P.2d at 896-99.

make

Weliever attempts to distinguish

was n0 written policy requiring “a complete

listing

0f

all

a showing 0f bad faith.

m, claiming

that in

Li. at

Bﬂ there

items in the inventory” and that “the

defendant failed t0 introduce the inventory 10g produced by the ofﬁcer.” (Appellant’s brief, pp.910.)

As

a result, he claims, “the State [in

established policy.”

Form 112

m, 122 Idaho

at

that the ofﬁcer in fact

complied with the

But there was a written policy

in

m, which

impounded vehicles must be inventoried by the impounding

prior to the time the wrecker operator takes control of the vehicle.”

377, 834 P.2d at 894. Neither that policy nor the policy in this case suggests

that every item in the

district court

showed

(Appellant’s brief, p.10.)

stated that “[i]n every case, all

ofﬁcer on ISP

BE]

impounded vehicle must be

(and then the Court 0f Appeals, in

the interpretation 0f the policy.

Further, there

listed

0n the inventory form. In both

BE) relied on the ofﬁcer’s testimony to inform

was no dispute

in

included 0n the ofﬁcer’s inventory. Li. at 379, 834 P.2d at 896.
relevant whether the inventory

list

was entered

cases, the

ﬂy
It is

that there

were items not

therefore unclear

how

it is

into evidence.

Courts in other jurisdictions have likewise rejected the proposition that an inventory
search must involve making a

no useful purpose

list

of absolutely everything located in the vehicle.

to require separate itemization
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“It

would serve

of each object found, regardless of its value, as

a precondition t0 accepting a search as an inventory search.” United States V. Lopez, 547 F.3d
364, 371—72 (2d Cir. 2008).

Such an obligation would
criminal laws

by requiring

.

.

.

With the enforcement of the

interfere severely

irrational,

unjustiﬁed suppression 0f evidence of crime

Where ofﬁcers, conducting a bona ﬁde search of an impounded vehicle, found
evidence 0f serious crime but, in making their inventory, failed t0 distinguish
between the maps of Connecticut and New York, or failed t0 list separately the
soiled baby blanket 0r a pack 0f gum.
Li.

E

alﬂ,

1g” vath

CitV of Lakewood, 83 F.3d 433 (10th Cir. 1996) (“contrary to

V.

Smyth’s argument that an inventory must include every item in the

one Reese’s Peanut Butter cup, ofﬁcers are

and

description,

to exercise

entitled to

some

car,

down

latitude

t0

and including

by way of general

judgment based on concerns which underlie the reasons

for an

inventory: t0 protect property, insure against claims of 10st, stolen 0r vandalized property, and t0

guard the police from danger”); State
(“Defendant

cites

no

cases,

and

V.

Organ, 234 P.3d 611, 616 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2010)

we found none,

holding that every item in the vehicle, regardless

0f value, must be included 0n the inventory report in order to ﬁnd an inventory search valid”);

A.3d 891, 906 (Md.

State V. Pamter, 170

jack,

jumper

cables,

Finally,

impounded

even

vehicle,

that

pp.9-10.)

App. 2017) (holding

and tennis shoes did not suggest
if the

it

illegality

that failure t0 list spare tire,

of inventory search).

policy had been phrased so as t0 require the listing of every item in the

would

still

Weliever’s motion to suppress.

show

Ct.

not have followed that the district court erred in denying

Weliever argues that

it is

sufﬁcient to warrant suppression to

an inventory search did not fully comply With the relevant policy. (Appellant’s
That View

is

mistaken. The ultimate inquiry

is

brief,

Whether the inventory search was

conducted in a reasonable manner and not as a pretext for a criminal investigation. While
conducting a search in compliance With established procedures raises a presumption that the
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search

was not conducted 0n

pretextual grounds, the failure t0 fully follow procedures does not

establish pretext or that the search

was otherwise unreasonable.

E

Whren V. United

States,

517

U.S. 806, 816 (1996) (concluding that although adherence t0 procedures shows lack of pretext,
deviation from procedures does not prove pretext).

does not necessarily translate into a search that

is

“Noncompliance With department policies

unreasonable per se.”

State V. Stewart, 152

Idaho 868, 872 n.1, 276 P.3d 740, 744 n.1 (Ct. App. 2012) (collecting cases holding that
inventory search was lawful despite failure t0 fully comply With policies and procedures).
Instead, “[i]t has only

been the complete absence of standard

criteria

guiding the execution of

inventory searches that has been categorically found t0 be Violative of the Fourth

Li.

Indeed, courts have even held that the deviation from policy

inventory

list

at all,

inventory search.

To justify

cases).

something

else;

not simply failing t0 include some items 0n

ﬂ

United States

V.

by

failing to

it,

Amendment.”
complete any

does not invalidate an

Garav, 938 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2019) (collecting

suppression, a mere deviation for procedures

is

not sufﬁcient. “‘There must be

something to suggest the police raised the inventory—search banner in an

after-

the-fact attempt t0 justify a simple investigatory search for incriminating evidence.” Li. (internal

quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States V. Rowland, 341 F.3d 774, 780 (8th Cir. 2003)).

Even assuming
everything that

them

to

case.”

car.

d0

was

ofﬁcers deviated from the written policy by failing t0 record

in the car,

so, the court

(R., p.67.)

the

and the

district court erred in

ﬁnding

that the policy did not require

determined that there was “no evidence of bad

There was,

at best, the ofﬁcers’ failure t0

faith or pretext in this

exhaustively

That slight deviation from policy—even assuming, arguendo, that

warrant suppression 0f evidence and the

district court

18

list

it

every item in the

is

one—does not

did not err in concluding as much.

The

district court

properly denied Weliever’s motion t0 suppress because ofﬁcers were

not required by policy or the Fourth

Amendment

to exhaustively list ever pebble

and piece of

paper in Weliever’s vehicle in order t0 conduct an inventory search 0f his lawfully impounded
vehicle.

CONCLUSION
The

state respectfully requests this

Court t0 afﬁrm Weliever’s judgment 0f conviction.

DATED this 22nd day 0f July, 2020.
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